WILL

Excerpt from Friedrich Nietzsche 's Beyond Good and Evil:

In all willing there is firstly a plurality of sensations,namely,the sensation of condition "away from which we go",the sensation of condition "towards which we go",the sensation of this 'from 'and 'towards' itself,and then besides,an accompanying muscular sensation,which,even without our putting in motion 'arms and legs', commences its action by force of habit,directly we 'WILL' anything.Therefore just as sensations are to be recognized as ingredients of the will,so,in the second place,thinking is also to be recognized;in every act of will there is a ruling thought; - and let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the 'willing',as if the will would then remain over! In the third place,the will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking,but,it is above all an 'emotion',and in fact the emotion of command.That which is termed 'freedom of will' is essentially the emotion of supremacy in respect to him who must obey: I am free,he must obey - this consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the straining of the attention,the straight look which fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgement that "this and nothing else is necessary now,"the inward certainty that obedience will be rendered - and whatever else pertains to the position of the commander. A man who wills commands something within himself renders obedience,or which he believes renders obedience. But now let us notice what is the strangest thing about will, - this affair so extremely complex,for which the people have only one name. In as much as in the given circumstances we are at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations of constraint,impulsion,pressure,resistance and motion which usually commence immediately after the act of will; in as much as, on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality,and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term 'I': a whole series of erroneous conclusions,  and consequently of false judgments about the will itself,has become attached to the act of willing - to such a degree that he who wills believes firmly that willing suffices for action. Since  in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the command - consequently obedience, and therefore action - was to be expected, the appearance has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were a necessity of effect ; in a word , he who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing,to the will itself,and thereby enjoys an increase of sensation of power which accompines all success.Freedom of will that is the expression of complex state of delight of the person exercising volition,who commands at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order - who,as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles but thinks within himself that it was really his own will that overcame them. in this way the person exercising volition,adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments,the useful 'underwills'or 'undersouls'- indeed our body is but a social structure composed of many souls- to his feelings of delight as a commander. What happens here is what happens in every well constructed and happy commonwealth,namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the success of commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying,on the basis,as already said ,of a social structure composed of many souls,on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willingness as such within the sphere of morals - regarded as the doctrine of relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of life manifests itself.