What is an ADIZ?
It’s a section of international airspace over which a
country declares its right to identify aircraft, ostensibly to protect itself
from foreign threat. It’s a product of customary international law but it’s not
jurisdictional.
What happens once an ADIZ is established?
A country would use radar to detect unexpected aircraft
flying in the ADIZ and observe them. This would sort some, if not most, into
the category of being unthreatening. Using radio, it would query those it was
concerned about. The country may ask who they are and what they are doing. If
they are not a security threat, that would be sufficient. If the country was
still not sure, it would launch an aircraft to intercept and observe. The
country would not have the authority to do anything else unless it thought the
aircraft was a direct threat to the country.
What’s the problem with China declaring an ADIZ?
Well, the problem is that China’s ADIZ overlaps with the
ADIZ that was created by the U.S. after World War-II and transferred to Japan
in 1969. Japan sees this as an affront to its sovereignty. The bigger problem
is that China’s ADIZ encompasses the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands claimed by both
China and Japan. This is the first time an overlapping ADIZ has been declared
in an area where there is a sovereignty dispute. As a result, with China
monitoring the space, and the U.S. and China’s neighbours defying it, there is
now an increased risk of either a deliberate or accidental incident involving
military aircraft. Some are also concerned that China thinks the ADIZ will
strengthen its claim over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands
Is it Diaoyu or Senkaku? And what’s the history issue
that crops up in every article?
The Chinese call the islands Diaoyudao. The Japanese call them Senkaku.
Impartial observers try to get both names in. The “history problem” (lishi
wenti) as China terms it, refers to the history of Japanese colonialism in
China. Japan, once a vassal state of imperial China, subjugated and humiliated
the Chinese not once but twice in different periods of time — in the late
1800s, and again, in the 1930s. Japan’s domination and exploitation of China,
along with the conquests of Western powers, falls under the “century of
humiliation” (bainian guochi) in the Chinese historical narrative.
The Diaoyudao islands were considered lost during this period
when Japan formally annexed them in 1895. The suffering at the hands of Japan
was particularly shocking for China and the issue remains hugely sensitive, not
just because Japan was considered an inferior vassal state at the beginning of
this tumultuous period, but also because modern Japan is seen as unremorseful
of the atrocities it inflicted on China.
So why did China suddenly declare the ADIZ? Is it just
about controlling Diaoyu/Senkaku?
That depends on whom you talk to. Chinese foreign policy
decision-making is highly opaque, so all anyone can do is to speculate and
there have been a number of speculative theories. First, China could be
redefining the status quo. China feels it has a right to an ADIZ to protect its
sovereignty over both its territory as well as its claimed maritime spaces.
After all, Japan has an ADIZ.
Moreover, Japan’s ADIZ comes within 130 km of China’s territory;
therefore it’s only fair that China’s ADIZ extends to within 130 km of Japan’s
territory. Second, it could be a direct challenge to Japan’s administration of
Diaoyu/Senkaku. Japan has administrative control over the islands; this could
be China’s attempt at a different kind of parallel control.
Third, this could be not about Diaoyu/Senkaku but rather about
bigger maritime security issues in the East China Sea and asserting Chinese
dominance. The New York Times quoted an unnamed adviser to President Obama
saying, “It’s pretty clear this isn’t about the islands.”
Fourth, it could be a combination of domestic political pressure
from Chinese nationalists in the media and the PLA, and President Xi Jinping
feeling his way into his new role. Japan is a domestic hot button issue and any
move by the government that could be interpreted as pushback against Japan
would appeal to a small but highly vocal section of nationalists in the media
as well as the PLA, which tends to take stronger stances on Chinese territorial
sovereignty than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That, combined with President
Xi’s relatively new leadership, could be a way for him to consolidate his
authority.
What does this mean for India?
Well, hawks would immediately jump to the conclusion that China
is more aggressive in its foreign policy, which does not bode well for its
relations with India. Certainly, China’s announcement of the ADIZ was
unexpected. It was done without any consultation with Japan and has thus been
seen as very disrespectful. It has also been called unnecessary. Since the ADIZ
is not jurisdictional, it makes no legal difference to China’s claim over
Diaoyu/Senkaku.
A more sober look, however, would take into account a few
additional facts. First, many countries have an ADIZ and establishing one is
not surprising in itself. It’s possible the Chinese government did not realise
that the establishment of the ADIZ would lead to this strong backlash. In their
eyes, they were establishing parity with Japan, not needling it. Second, China
backed off from their initial terming of the ADIZ as “emergency defensive
measures” and insisted that they just want notification from aircraft entering
the airspace, and are not about to respond with force.
Third, as The Diplomat pointed out, China is engaging in
“lawfare” — using international institutions to achieve strategic goals. This
is indicative of acceptance rather than the rejection of the current
international order. Fourth, because China, like all other countries, has a
right to an ADIZ, the ADIZ itself should not be the problem. Rather, China’s
actions should be scrutinised.
If Japanese planes flying towards Diaoyu/Senkaku are intercepted
on a regular basis, that would be more of an issue than the establishment of
the ADIZ itself, unexpected though it may have been. Last, unpalatable as this
may be to the Indian power elite, given the focus on the “China threat”, India,
currently at least, simply does not factor into China’s strategic priorities.
China is intently focused on the United States. Implicitly, this may actually
be a good thing, leading to maintenance of the status quo for the foreseeable
future.
SOURCE: THE HINDU
